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Abstract A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric
information is considered. For this model, a dynamic programming characteri-
zation of the value (if it exists) is presented. If the value of the zero-sum game
does not exist, then the dynamic program provides bounds on the upper and
lower values of the zero-sum game. This dynamic program is then used for a
class of zero-sum stochastic games with complete information on one side and
partial information on the other, that is, games where one player has complete
information about state, actions and observation history while the other player
may only have partial information about the state and action history. For such
games, the value exists and can be characterized using the dynamic program.
It is further shown that for this class of games, there exists a Nash equilib-
rium where the more informed player plays a common information belief based
strategy and, this strategy can be computed using the dynamic program.
Keywords Dynamic Games · Asymmetric information · Upper and lower
values
1 Introduction
Zero-sum games have been widely used as a model of strategic decision-making
in the presence of adversaries. Such decision-making scenarios arise in a range
of domains including (i) security of cyber-physical and infrastructure systems
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such as the power grid and water networks in the presence of cyber or phys-
ical attacks [40,3,2,41,35,37] (ii) cyber-security of networked computing and
communication systems [40,1], (iii) designing anti-poaching measures [13,12,
9], (iv) military operations in the presence of hostile agents [17] and, (v) com-
petitive markets and geopolitical interactions [23,4]. In many cases, the adver-
sarial interactions occur over time in a dynamic and uncertain environment.
Zero-sum stochastic games provide a useful model for these situations. In these
games, two players may jointly control the evolution of the state of a stochastic
dynamic system with one player trying to minimize the total cost while the
other trying to maximize it. In stochastic games with symmetric information,
all players have the same information about the state and action histories.
Such games have been extensively studied in the literature in both zero-sum
and nonzero-sum settings [15,29,14,24,6]. In many situations of interest, how-
ever, the players may have different information about the state and action
histories. A potential attacker of a cyber-physical system for example, may not
have the same information as the defender; adversaries in a battlefield may
have different information about the surroundings and about each other. The
focus of this paper is on such asymmetric information settings.
We adopt a model of asymmetric information that was originally developed
for decentralized stochastic control [28]. This model partitions each player’s
information at each time into a common information part and a private in-
formation part. The common information at time t is known to all players at
that time and at all times in the future. In addition to the common infor-
mation, each player may have some private information. It has been noted in
the existing literature that this model subsumes a wide range of information
structures [28,26].
In our model, it may be the case that no player knows the current state
of the underlying stochastic system perfectly. Further, since each player may
have some private information, one player’s information is not necessarily in-
cluded in the other player’s information. The partial observability of the state,
the asymmetry of information and the fact that each player may have some
private information complicates the characterization and computation of the
equilibrium cost (value) and equilibrium strategies. We provide two results for
this general model of zero-sum stochastic game of asymmetric information: (i)
If the game has a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies, then our result
provides dynamic program based characterizations of the value of the game.
Each step of these programs involve a min-max (or max-min) problem over the
space of prescriptions which are functions from players’ private information to
actions. (ii) If the game does not have a Nash equilibrium, then our dynamic
programs provide a lower bound on the upper value of the game and an upper
bound on the lower value of the game.
We then specialize our model to the case where (i) one player (say, the
attacker) has partial information on the system state and the other player’s
(say, the defender’s) actions; (ii) the defender has complete information, that
is, the defender knows the system state as well as the attacker’s information.
We allow both players to control the system state. Our model can be viewed
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as a generalization of those in [32,33,19,42]. For such games with complete
information on one side and partial information on the other, we first show that
a Nash equilibrium exists and thus, the upper and lower values are equal. This
allows us to characterize the value of the game using our dynamic programming
approach. We also describe some structural properties of the value functions
that could be leveraged for making the dynamic program computationally
tractable. Further, we find a sufficient statistic for the more informed player,
i.e, we show that there exists a Nash equilibrium such that the more informed
player plays a common information belief based strategy [26], [30] and our
dynamic programming approach can be used to compute this strategy.
1.1 Related Work
1. Stochastic games of symmetric information: In this stochastic game model,
the players have access to the same information. Thus, at any time t, each
player has no uncertainty regarding other players’ information and makes
a decision anticipating the other players’ strategies. Such games of sym-
metric information have been extensively studied in the literature [15,29,
14,24,6]. Because of this symmetry, players’ shared/common information
(or a function of it) can be treated as a state and utilized to decompose
a dynamic game into simpler single stage/static Bayesian games. These
single stage games can then be solved in a backward inductive manner to
obtain the value and Nash equilibria (if any exist). In this paper, we fo-
cus on models in which players have different information and thus, the
methodology described above for solving symmetric information games is
not directly applicable to our model.
2. Zero-sum games with limited information on one side: Solving stochastic
zero-sum games with complete information on one side and limited infor-
mation on the other has been investigated before with varying degrees of
generality. In [22,32], the state evolution was uncontrolled, in [33,19], the
state could only be controlled by the more-informed player, and in [42], the
state could be controlled by both players. In all these works, both play-
ers’ actions are commonly observed and, the less-informed player has no
state information. A related model, in which the system is uncontrolled
and players’ actions are commonly observed but both players may have
asymmetric state information, has been investigated in [16]. In our general
model, both players may have imperfect information about the system and
the other player’s actions, and both players may control the system state.
We also consider a specialized model in which the defender has complete
information (state and attacker’s information). In this specialized model,
we allow the system to be controlled by both players. While the defender
in this model has complete information, the attacker may only have partial
information on the state and the defender’s action history.
3. Stochastic games of asymmetric information with strategy-independent com-
mon information beliefs: In [26], a common information based dynamic
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program was developed for finding Nash equilibria in general (i.e. not nec-
essarily zero-sum) stochastic games of asymmetric information. The key
idea in this approach is to first convert the game of asymmetric informa-
tion into a virtual game of symmetric information. This virtual game of
symmetric information is then solved using the approach discussed earlier
[15,29,14,24,6] and, the solution thus obtained is transformed to obtain
a solution to the original game of asymmetric information. However, this
approach relies on an assumption on the players’ information (see Assump-
tion 2 in [26]). This assumption holds only for certain classes of information
structures and may not necessarily be true for our game models, both the
general model and the specialized model with complete information on one
side.
4. Common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria in stochastic games
of asymmetric information: Authors in [30] and [39] consider a stochastic
game model (can be non-zero sum) in which the system state can be de-
composed into a public state that is commonly observed by all players and
a private state that is privately observed by each player. In this model,
all the players’ past actions are commonly observed and additionally, an
imperfect version of players’ private state may be disclosed to all the play-
ers at each time. For this model, the authors provide characterizations
of perfect Bayesian equilibria under some assumptions on the evolution
of players’ private state. In this paper, we only consider two-player zero-
sum games. However, our general model captures many other models with
system dynamics and information structures that may not conform to the
model considered in [30,39]. For instance, unlike in [30,39], players’ actions
may not be fully observed in our model. Further, the solutions in [30,39]
rely on strong existence assumptions that may not be true in general.
Our dynamic program based characterization of the value relies on our
construction of two virtual games. The first virtual game is constructed such
that the players have symmetric information and its upper and lower values
are equal to those of the original game. The information of the players in
this virtual game is then expanded, resulting in another virtual game. We
provide a dynamic program based characterization for the upper and lower
values of this expanded virtual game and then, we establish the relationship
between the upper and lower values of the expanded virtual game and those of
the original game. Expansion of information structure has been used in prior
work to find equilibrium costs/strategies in zero-sum games. Reference [5]
investigated linear stochastic differential games where players have the same
linear observations. The author expanded the information structure of the
game to derive a saddle-point (Nash) equilibrium in the expanded strategy
space which was then transformed to obtain a saddle-point equilibrium of the
original game.
Our work is most closely related to [25] and [26] . We follow the approach
in [25] and build on its results. The system model in [25] conformed to a
specific structure, that is, the system state could be decomposed into three
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components: a public state that is commonly observed (perhaps partially) and
a privately observed component for each player. The model in our paper is
substantially more general than in [25]. Another major restriction in [25] was
that the players were allowed to play only pure strategies. In this paper, we
allow the players to play behavioral strategies. Our model is similar to [26]
but we do not make the critical assumption made in [26] that the common
information based beliefs be strategy-independent (see Assumption 2 of [26]).
Removing this assumption makes our model much more widely applicable than
the model in [26].
1.2 Contributions
The main contributions of our paper are:
1. We consider a general stochastic zero-sum game model in which the players
select their actions using different information. For this general model, we
provide a dynamic programming characterization of the value of the zero-
sum game, if it exists. If the value does not exist, then our characterization
provides bounds on the upper and lower values of the zero-sum game.
2. We then specialize our model to the case in which the defender has complete
information (system state and attacker’s information) and the attacker may
have partial information. For this model, we show that the value of the zero-
sum game exists and thus, our dynamic program characterizes the value of
this game.
3. For this specialized model, we prove that the value functions in our dynamic
program satisfy some additional properties that can be leveraged to make
the dynamic program computationally more tractable. One such property
is that the value functions are piecewise linear and convex in the common
information belief.
4. In this specialized model, we show that there exists a Nash equilibrium such
that the defender (more-informed player) uses a common information belief
based strategy which can be computed using our dynamic programming
approach.
1.3 Notation
Random variables/vectors are denoted by upper case letters, their realizations
by the corresponding lower case letters. In general, subscripts are used as time
index while superscripts are used to index decision making agents. For time
indices t1 ≤ t2, Xt1:t2 (resp. gt1:t2) is the short hand notation for the variables
(Xt1 , Xt1+1, ..., Xt2) (resp. functions (gt1 , . . . , gt2)). Similarly, X
1:2 is the short
hand notation for the collection of variables (X1, X2). Operators P(·) and E[·]
denote the probability of an event, and the expectation of a random variable
respectively. For random variables/vectors X and Y , P(·|Y = y), E[X |Y = y]
and P(X = x | Y = y) are denoted by P(·|y), E[X |y] and P(x | y), respectively.
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For a strategy g, we use Pg(·) (resp. Eg[·]) to indicate that the probability (resp.
expectation) depends on the choice of g. For any finite set A, ∆A denotes the
probability simplex over the set A.
1.4 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We formulate the game in Section
2 and describe a virtual game with symmetric information in Section 3. In
Section 4, we describe an expanded virtual game, establish the relationship
between the values of the original and the expanded game and describe our
dynamic programming characterization of the value. In Section 5, we analyze
the model with complete information on one side and state our results. We
conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Problem Formulation
Consider a dynamic system with two players. The system operates in discrete
time over a horizon T . Let Xt ∈ Xt be the state of the system at time t, and
let U it ∈ U
i
t be the action of player i at time t, where i = 1, 2. The state of the
system evolves in a controlled Markovian manner as
Xt+1 = ft(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t ,W
s
t ), (1)
where W st is the system noise. There are two observation processes Y
1
t ∈ Y
1
t
and Y 2t ∈ Y
2
t given as
Y it = h
i
t(Xt, U
1
t−1, U
2
t−1,W
i
t ), i = 1, 2, (2)
where W 1t and W
2
t are observation noises. We assume that the sets Xt,U
i
t and
Yit are finite for all i and t. Further, the random variablesX1,W
s
t ,W
i
t (referred
to as the primitive random variables) can take finitely many values and are
mutually independent.
2.1 Information Structure
The collection of variables (i.e. observations, actions) available to player i at
time t is denoted by Iit . I
i
t is a subset of all observations until time t and
actions until t− 1, i.e, Iit ⊆ {Y
1:2
1:t , U
1:2
1:t−1}. The set of all possible realizations
of Iit is denoted by I
i
t .
Information Iit can be decomposed into private and common information,
i.e. Iit = Ct ∪ P
i
t . Common information Ct is the set of variables known to
both players at time t while variables in the private information P it are known
only to player i. Let Ct be the set of all realizations of common information at
time t and let P it be the set of all realizations of private information for player
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i at time t. We make the following assumption on the evolution of common
and private information. This is similar to Assumption 1 of [26]1.
Assumption 1 The evolution of common and private information available
to the players is as follows:
1. The common information Ct is increasing with time, i.e. Ct ⊂ Ct+1. Let
Zt+1 := Ct+1 \Ct be the increment in common information. Thus, Ct+1 =
{Ct, Zt+1}. Furthermore,
Zt+1 = ζt+1(P
1:2
t , U
1:2
t , Y
1:2
t+1), (3)
where ζt+1 is a fixed transformation.
2. The private information evolves as
P it+1 = ξ
i
t+1(P
i
t , U
i
t , Y
i
t+1), (4)
where ξit+1 is a fixed transformation.
As noted in [28] and [26], a number of information structures satisfy the above
assumption.
2.2 Strategies
Players can use any information available to them to select their actions and
we allow behavioral strategies for both players. Thus, player i chooses a dis-
tribution δU it over its action space using a control law g
i
t : I
i
t → ∆U
i
t , i.e.
δU it = g
i
t(I
i
t ) = g
i
t(P
i
t , Ct). (5)
Player i’s action at time t is randomly chosen from U it according to the dis-
tribution δU it . We will at times refer to δU
i
t as player i’s behavioral action at
time t. It will be helpful for our analysis to explicitly describe the random-
ization procedure used by the players. To do so, we assume that player i has
access to i.i.d. random variables V i1:T that are uniformly distributed over the
interval (0, 1]. The variables V 11:T , V
2
1:T are independent of each other and of
the primitive random variables. Further, player i has access to a mechanism
κ that takes as input V it and a distribution over U
i
t and generates a random
action with the input distribution. Thus, player i’s action at time t can be
written as U it = κ(g
i
t(I
i
t ), V
i
t ).
Remark 1 One choice of the mechanism κ can be described as follows: Suppose
U it = {1, 2, ..n} and the input distribution is (p1, ...pn). We can partition the
interval (0, 1] into n intervals (ai, bi] such that the length of ith interval is
bi − ai = pi. Then, U it = k if V
i
t ∈ (ak, bk] for k = 1, . . . , n.
1 Note that we do not impose Assumption 2 of [26].
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The collection of control laws gi = (gi1, . . . , g
i
T ) is referred to as the control
strategy of player i, and the pair of control strategies (g1, g2) is referred to as
a strategy profile. Let the set of all possible control strategies for player i be
Gi.
The total expected cost associated with a strategy profile (g1, g2) is
J(g1, g2) := E(g
1,g2)
[
T∑
t=1
ct(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t )
]
, (6)
where ct : Xt × U1t × U
2
t → R is the cost function at time t. Player 1 wants
to minimize the total expected cost, while Player 2 wants to maximize it. We
refer to this zero-sum game as Game G .
Definition 1 The upper value of the game G is defined as
Su(G ) := inf
g1∈G1
sup
g2∈G2
J(g1, g2). (7)
The lower value of the game G is defined as
Sl(G ) := sup
g2∈G2
inf
g1∈G1
J(g1, g2). (8)
If the upper and lower values are the same, they are referred to as the value
of the game and denoted by S(G ).
A Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game G is a strategy profile (g1∗, g2∗) such
that for every g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2, we have
J(g1∗, g2) ≤ J(g1∗, g2∗) ≤ J(g1, g2∗). (9)
Nash equilibria in zero-sum games satisfy the following property [29].
Proposition 1 If a Nash equilibrium in Game G exists, then for every Nash
equilibrium (g1∗, g2∗) in Game G , we have
J(g1∗, g2∗) = Sl(G ) = Su(G ) = S(G ). (10)
Remark 2 Note that the existence of a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed in
general. However, if players have perfect recall, i.e.
{U i1:t−1} ∪ I
i
t−1 ⊆ I
i
t (11)
for every i and t, then the existence of a behavioral strategy equilibrium is
guaranteed by Kuhn’s theorem [21].
The objective of this work is to characterize the upper and lower values
Su(G ) and Sl(G ) of Game G . To this end, we will define a virtual game Gv and
an “expanded” virtual game Ge. These virtual games will be used to obtain
bounds on the upper and lower values of the original game G .
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3 Virtual Game Gv
The virtual game Gv is constructed using the methodology in [26]. This game
involves the same set of primitive random variables as in Game G . The two
players of game G are replaced by two virtual players in Gv. The virtual players
operate as follows. At each time t, virtual player i selects a function Γ it that
maps private information P it to a distribution δU
i
t over the space U
i
t . We refer
to these functions as prescriptions. Let Bit be the set of all possible prescriptions
for virtual player i at time t (i.e. Bit is the set of all mappings from P
i
t to ∆U
i
t ).
Once the virtual players select their prescriptions, the action U it is ran-
domly generated according to distribution Γ it (P
i
t ). More precisely, the system
dynamics for this game are given by:
Xt+1 = ft(Xt, U
1:2
t ,W
s
t ) (12)
P it+1 = ξ
i
t+1(P
i
t , U
i
t , Y
i
t+1) i = 1, 2, (13)
Y it+1 = h
i
t+1(Xt+1, U
1:2
t ,W
i
t+1) i = 1, 2, (14)
U it = κ(Γ
i
t (P
i
t ), V
i
t ) i = 1, 2, (15)
Zt+1 = ζt+1(P
1:2
t , U
1:2
t , Y
1:2
t+1) (16)
where the functions ft, h
i
t, ξ
i
t, κ and ζt are the same as in G .
In the virtual game, virtual players use the common information Ct to se-
lect their prescriptions at time t. The ith virtual player selects its prescription
according to a control law χit, i.e. Γ
i
t = χ
i
t(Ct). For virtual player i, the collec-
tion of control laws over the entire time horizon χi = (χi1, . . . , χ
i
T ) is referred
to as its control strategy. Let Hit be the set of all possible control laws for
virtual player i at time t and let Hi be the set of all possible control strategies
for virtual player i, i.e. Hi = Hi1 × · · · × H
i
T . The total cost associated with
the game for a strategy profile (χ1, χ2) is
J (χ1, χ2) = E(χ
1,χ2)
[
T∑
t=1
ct(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t )
]
, (17)
where the function ct is the same as in Game G .
The following lemma establishes a connection between the original game
G and the virtual game Gv constructed above.
Lemma 1 Let Su(Gv) and S
l(Gv) be, respectively, the upper and lower values
of the virtual game Gv. Then,
Sl(G ) = Sl(Gv) and S
u(G ) = Su(Gv).
Consequently, if a Nash equilibrium exists in the original game G , then S(G ) =
Sl(Gv) = S
u(Gv).
Proof See Appendix A.
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The authors in [26] use the virtual game to find equilibrium costs and
strategies for a stochastic dynamic game of asymmetric information. How-
ever, the methodology in [26] is applicable only under the assumption that the
posterior beliefs on state Xt and private information P
1,2
t given the common
information do not depend on the strategy profile being used (see Assumption
2 in [26]). We will refer to this assumption as the strategy-independent beliefs
(SIB) assumption. As pointed out in [26], the SIB assumption is satisfied by
some special system models and information structures but is not true for
general stochastic dynamic games. A simple example which does not satisfy
the SIB assumption is the following delayed sharing information structure
[27]: Consider game G with common information Ct = {Y
1,2
1:t−2, U
1,2
1:t−2} and
P it = {Y
i
t , Y
i
t−1, U
i
t−1}. Another example of a game where the SIB assumption
fails is presented in Section 5.
Thus, we are faced with the following situation: if our zero-sum game sat-
isfies the SIB assumption, we can adopt the results in [26] to find equilibrium
costs (i.e. the value) of our game. However, if the zero-sum game does not
satisfy the SIB assumption, then the methodology of [26] is inapplicable. In
the next section, we will develop a methodology to bound the upper and lower
values of the zero-sum game G even when the game does not satisfy the SIB
assumption.
4 Expanded Virtual Game Ge with Prescription History
In order to circumvent the SIB assumption, we now construct an expanded
virtual game Ge by increasing the amount of information available to virtual
players in game Gv. In this new game Ge, the state dynamics, observation
processes, primitive random variables and cost function are all the same as
in the game Gv. The only difference is in the information used by the virtual
players to select their prescriptions. The virtual players now have access to the
common information Ct as well as all the past prescriptions of both players,
i.e., Γ 1:21:t−1. Virtual player i selects its prescription at time t using a control law
χ˜it, i.e, Γ
i
t = χ˜
i
t(Ct, Γ
1:2
1:t−1). Let H˜
i
t be the set of all such control laws at time t
for virtual player i. H˜i := H˜i1 × · · · × H˜
i
T is the set of all control strategies for
player i. The total cost associated with the game for a strategy profile (χ˜1, χ˜2)
is
J (χ˜1, χ˜2) = E(χ˜
1,χ˜2)
[
T∑
t=1
ct(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t )
]
. (18)
Remark 3 Note that any strategy χi ∈ Hi is equivalent to the strategy χ˜i ∈ H˜i
that satisfies the following condition: for each time t and for each realization
of common information ct ∈ Ct,
χ˜it(ct, γ
1:2
1:t−1) = χ
i
t(ct) ∀ γ
1:2
1:t−1 ∈ B
1:2
1:t−1. (19)
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Hence, with slight abuse of notation, we can say that the strategy space Hi in
the virtual game Gv is a subset of the strategy space H˜i in the expanded game
Ge. For this reason, the function J in (18) can be thought of as an extension
of the function J in (17).
Remark 4 Expansion of information structures has been used in prior work to
find equilibrium costs/strategies. See, for example, [5] which studies a linear
stochastic differential game where both players have a common noisy observa-
tion of the state.
4.1 Upper and Lower Values of Games Gv and Ge
We will now establish the relationship between the upper and lower values
of the expanded game Ge and the virtual game Gv. To do so, we define the
following mappings between the strategies in games Gv and Ge.
Definition 2 Let ̺i : H˜1 × H˜2 → Hi be an operator that maps a strategy
profile (χ˜1, χ˜2) in virtual game Ge to a strategy χ
i for virtual player i in game
Gv as follows: For t = 1, 2, . . . , T,
χit(ct) := χ˜
i
t(ct, γ˜
1:2
1:t−1), (20)
where γ˜js = χ˜
j
s(cs, γ˜
1:2
1:s−1) for every 1 ≤ s ≤ t− 1 and j = 1, 2. We denote the
ordered pair (̺1, ̺2) by ̺.
The mapping ̺ is defined in such a way that the strategy profile (χ˜1, χ˜2) and
the strategy profile ̺(χ˜1, χ˜2) induce identical dynamics in the respective games
Ge and Gv.
Lemma 2 Let (χ1, χ2) and (χ˜1, χ˜2) be strategy profiles for games Gv and Ge,
such that χi = ̺i(χ˜1, χ˜2), i = 1, 2. Then,
J (χ1, χ2) = J (χ˜1, χ˜2). (21)
Proof See Appendix B.
The following theorem connects the upper and lower values of the two
virtual games and the original game.
Theorem 1 The lower and upper values of the three games defined above
satisfy the following:
Sl(G ) = Sl(Gv) ≤ S
l(Ge) ≤ S
u(Ge) ≤ S
u(Gv) = S
u(G ).
Consequently, if a Nash equilibrium exists in the original game G , then S(G ) =
Sl(Ge) = S
u(Ge).
Proof See Appendix C.
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Using Theorem 1, we can obtain bounds on the upper and lower values of
the original game by computing the upper and lower values of the expanded
game Ge.
Remark 5 The Nash equilibria of the virtual game Gv and the expanded game
Ge are related. If the strategy profile (χ
1∗, χ2∗) is a Nash equilibrium in the
virtual game Gv, then it is a Nash equilibrium in the expanded game Ge. The
converse, however, may not be true. This can be shown using arguments similar
to those used for proving Theorem 1 in [25].
4.2 The Dynamic Programming Characterization
We now describe a methodology for finding the upper and lower values of the
expanded game Ge. Suppose the virtual players are using the strategy profile
(χ˜1, χ˜2) in the expanded game Ge. Let Πt be the virtual players’ belief on the
state and private information based on their information in game Ge. Thus,
Πt is defined as
Πt(xt, p
1:2
t ) := P
(χ˜1,χ˜2)(Xt = xt, P
1:2
t = p
1:2
t | Ct, Γ
1:2
1:t−1), ∀xt, p
1
t , p
2
t .
We refer to Πt as the common information belief (CIB). Πt takes values in
the set St := ∆(Xt × P1t × P
2
t ).
Definition 3 Given a belief π on the state and private informations at time t
and mappings γi, i = 1, 2, from P it to∆U
i
t , we define γ
i(pit;u) as the probability
assigned to action u under the probability distribution γi(pit). Also, define
c˜t(π, γ
1, γ2) :=
∑
xt,p
1:2
t ,u
1:2
t
ct(xt, u
1
t , u
2
t )π(xt, p
1
t , p
2
t )γ
1(p1t ;u
1
t )γ
2(p2t ;u
2
t ). (22)
c˜t(π, γ
1, γ2) is the expected value of the cost at time t if the state and pri-
vate informations have π as their probability distribution and γ1, γ2 are the
prescriptions chosen by the virtual players.
Lemma 3 For any strategy profile (χ˜1, χ˜2), the common information based
belief Πt evolves almost surely as
Πt+1 = Ft(Πt, Γ
1:2
t , Zt+1), t ≥ 1, (23)
where Ft is a fixed transformation that does not depend on the virtual players’
strategies. Further, the total expected cost can be expressed as
J (χ˜1, χ˜2) = E(χ˜
1,χ˜2)
[
T∑
t=1
c˜t(Πt, Γ
1
t , Γ
2
t )
]
, (24)
where c˜t is as defined in equation (22).
Proof See Appendix D.
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Remark 6 Because (23) is an almost sure equality, the transformation Ft in
Lemma 3 is not necessarily unique. In Appendix D, we identify a class of
transformations such that for any transformation Ft in this class, Lemma 3
holds. We denote this class by B.
We now describe two dynamic programs, one for each virtual player in Ge.
4.2.1 The min-max dynamic program
The minimizing virtual player (virtual player 1) in game Ge solves the following
dynamic program. Define V uT+1(πT+1) = 0 for every πT+1. In a backward in-
ductive manner, at each time t ≤ T and for each possible common information
belief πt and prescriptions γ
1
t , γ
2
t , define
wut (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) := c˜t(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) + E[V
u
t+1(Ft(πt, γ
1:2
t , Zt+1)) | πt, γ
1:2
t ] (25)
V ut (πt) := inf
γ1t
sup
γ2t
wut (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ). (26)
4.2.2 The max-min dynamic program
The maximizing virtual player (virtual player 2) in game Ge solves the follow-
ing dynamic program. Define V lT+1(πT+1) = 0 for every πT+1. In a backward
inductive manner, at each time t ≤ T and for each possible common informa-
tion belief πt and prescriptions γ
1
t , γ
2
t , define
wlt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) := c˜t(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) + E[V
l
t+1(Ft(πt, γ
1:2
t , Zt+1)) | πt, γ
1:2
t ] (27)
V lt (πt) := sup
γ2t
inf
γ1t
wlt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ). (28)
Lemma 4 For any realization of common information based belief πt, the inf
and sup in (26) are achieved, i.e. there exists a measurable mapping χ˜1∗t :
St → B1t such that
V ut (πt) = min
γ1t
max
γ2t
wut (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) = max
γ2t
wut (πt, χ˜
1∗
t (πt), γ
2
t ). (29)
Similarly, for any realization of common information based belief πt, the sup
and inf in (28) are achieved, i.e, there exists a measurable mapping χ˜2∗t : St →
B2t such that
V lt (πt) = max
γ2t
min
γ1t
wlt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) = min
γ1t
wlt(πt, γ
1
t , χ˜
2∗
t (πt)). (30)
Proof See Appendix F.
The following theorem establishes that the two dynamic programs de-
scribed above characterize the upper and lower values of game Ge.
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Theorem 2 The upper and lower values of the expanded virtual game Ge are
given by
Su(Ge) = E[V
u
1 (Π1)], (31)
Sl(Ge) = E[V
l
1 (Π1)]. (32)
Further, the strategies χ˜1∗ and χ˜2∗ (as defined in Lemma 4) obtained from the
dynamic programs are, respectively, min-max and max-min strategies in the
expanded virtual game Ge.
Proof See Appendix G. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2 gives us a dynamic programming characterization of the upper
and lower values of the expanded game. As mentioned in Theorem 1, the upper
and lower values of the expanded game provide bounds on the corresponding
values of the original game. Further, if the original game has a Nash equilib-
rium, the dynamic programs of Theorem 2 characterize the value of the game.
Note that this applies to any dynamic game of the form in Section 2 where the
common information is non-decreasing in time and the private information has
a “state-like” update equation (see Assumption 1). As noted before, a variety
of information structures satisfy this assumption [28], [26].
The computational burden of solving the dynamic programs of Theorem 2
would depend on the specific information structure being considered, i.e., on
the exact nature of common and private information. At one extreme, we can
consider the following instance of the original game G : Ct = (X1:t), P
1
t = P
2
t =
∅. It is easy to see that in this case, the common information belief can be
replaced by the current state in the dynamic programs and the prescriptions
are simply distributions on the players’ finite action sets. Also, in this case, wut
and wlt are bilinear functions of the prescriptions and the min-max/max-min
problems at each stage of the dynamic program can be solved by a linear pro-
gram [31]. On the other extreme, we can consider an instance of game G with
Ct = ∅, P it = Y
i
1:t, i = 1, 2,. In this case, the common information belief will
be on the current state and observation histories of the two players and the
prescriptions will take values in a large-dimensional space. Also, the functions
wut and w
l
t (for t < T ) in this case do no have any apparent structure that
can be exploited for efficient computation of the min-max and max-min val-
ues in the dynamic program. One general approach that can be used for any
instance of game G is to discretize the CIB belief space and compute approxi-
mate value functions V ut and V
l
t in a backward inductive manner. However, we
believe that significant structural and computational insights can be obtained
by specializing the dynamic programs of Theorem 2 to the specific instance
of the game being considered. We demonstrate this in the next section where
we discuss an information structure where one player has complete informa-
tion while the other player has only partial information. We will show that
in this case, the functions wut and w
l
t turn out to be identical at all times t
and they satisfy some structural properties that can be leveraged for compu-
tation. Further, we will show that for this information structure, the dynamic
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programming characterization in Theorem 2 allows us to find an equilibrium
strategy for player 1 in the original game G .
5 Games with Complete Information on One Side and Partial
Information on the Other
In this section, we consider a special case of the original game G (described in
Section 2) where player 1 has complete information, that is, it knows the entire
state history as well as the observation and action histories of both players. On
the other hand, player 2 has only partial information on the state and player
1’s action history. For games with this information structure, we show that (i)
a Nash equilibrium, and hence the value of the game, exists; (ii) the value can
be computed using the methodology proposed in Section 4; (iii) the dynamic
program in Section 4 also characterizes an equilibrium strategy for player 1;
(iv) the value functions of the dynamic program satisfy some key structural
properties that may be computationally useful.
5.1 System Model
Consider a system with state evolution as in equation (1). At each time t, player
1 observes the state perfectly but player 2 gets an imperfect observation Y 2t
defined as follows:
Y 2t = h
2
t (Xt, U
1
t−1, U
2
t−1,W
2
t ). (33)
Player 1 has complete information: at each time t, it knows the entire state,
observation and action histories. Player 2 has partial information: at each time
t, it knows only the observation history Y 21:t and its own action history U
2
1:t−1.
Thus, the total information available to each player at t is as follows:
I1t = {X1:t, Y
2
1:t, U
1
1:t−1, U
2
1:t−1} (34)
I2t = {Y
2
1:t, U
2
1:t−1}. (35)
Clearly, I2t ⊆ I
1
t , that is, player 1 is more informed than player 2. The common
and private information for this game can be written as follows: Ct = I
2
t ,
P 1t = {X1:t, U
1
1:t−1} and P
2
t = ∅. The increment in common information at
time t is Zt = {Y 2t , U
2
t−1}. The total expected cost is as defined in (6). As
before, Player 1 wants to minimize the total expected cost, while Player 2
wants to maximize it. Players’ strategies are as described in (5). We refer to
this game as Game G special.
Remark 7 Consider a scenario in which player 1’s information at time t is
{X1:t, U
1
1:t−1, U
2
1:t−1}. Player 2’s information at time t is {Y
2
1:t, U
2
1;t−1} and his
observation Y 2t is of the form Y
2
t = h
2
t (Xt, U
1
t−1, U
2
t−1). That is, player 2 ob-
serves a quantized version of the current system state and player 1’s previous
action. At first glance, it might appear that the second player’s private in-
formation for this scenario is P 2t = Y
2
1:t and thus, it does not fit the model
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in Game G special. However, player 1 knows the function h2t and the variables
Xt, U
1
t−1, U
2
t−1. Thus, he can simply compute Y
2
1:t and select his behavior ac-
tion using {X1:t, Y 21:t, U
1
1:t−1, U
2
1:t−1}. In that case, P
2
t = ∅ and therefore, this
scenario fits the model in Game G special.
Remark 8 The model described above subsumes the system dynamics and in-
formation structures in [32,19,42] and [33]. In all these works, the less-informed
player does not have any state information and can only observe the more-
informed player’s action. That is, in these works, Y 2t = U
1
t−1 (which is a special
case of (33) above) and thus, I2t = {U
1
1:t−1, U
2
1:t−1}. Further, the system dy-
namics in some of these models are more specialized. In particular, in [32], the
system is uncontrolled and in [19] and [33], the less-informed player cannot
control the state. Note that our model allows for both players to influence the
system dynamics (see (1)).
The following lemmas establish the existence and a structural property of Nash
equilibrium strategies in game H .
Lemma 5 A Nash equilibrium exists in game G special.
Proof Notice that the players have perfect recall. Therefore, as discussed in
Remark 2, the existence of a behavioral strategy Nash equilibrium is guaran-
teed.
Lemma 6 There exists a Nash equilibrium (g1∗, g2∗) such that the control law
g1∗t selects player 1’s behavioral action using only Xt and I
2
t , i.e,
δU1t = g
1∗
t (Xt, I
2
t ).
Proof See Appendix H.
Because of the above lemma, we can restrict player 1’s information structure to
be I1t = {Xt, I
2
t }. Thus, the common and private information become: Ct = I
2
t ,
P 1t = {Xt} and P
2
t = ∅. We refer to this game with reduced private informa-
tion as Game H . The corresponding virtual game and expanded virtual game
are denoted by Hv and He respectively.
5.2 Expanded Game and the Dynamic Program
We can now proceed with the construction of the expanded virtual game as
outlined in Section 4. Recall that in the expanded virtual game, virtual players
select prescriptions based on common information and the prescription history.
5.2.1 Belief update
As noted in Remark 6, the common information belief update rule Ft is not
unique and there is an entire class B of update rules for which Lemma 3 holds.
When this class B is specialized to the GameHe, there exists an update rule Ft
in this class that does not use virtual player 2’s prescription γ2t . The following
lemma makes this precise.
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Lemma 7 For any strategy profile (χ˜1, χ˜2), the common information belief
Πt evolves almost surely as
Πt+1 = Ft(Πt, Γ
1
t , Zt+1), t ≥ 1, (36)
where Ft is a fixed transformation that does not depend on the virtual players’
strategies.
Proof See Appendix I.
Remark 9 Lemma 7 is true as long as I2t ⊆ I
1
t , even if player 1 does not have
complete state information. Thus, we can say that the belief update function
does not depend on Γ 2t as long as the second player has no private information.
Remark 10 In [32], [33] and [19], it was assumed that the less informed player
cannot control the state evolution. In that case, Lemma 7 is easy to establish.
We would like to emphasize that Lemma 7 is true for our more general model
where both players control the state evolution.
5.2.2 Dynamic program
Since a Nash equilibrium exists in game H , the upper and lower values of
the corresponding expanded virtual game are both equal to the value of game
H (see Theorem 1). According to Theorem 2, this value can be obtained
by solving either the min-max dynamic program or the max-min dynamic
program as discussed in Section 4.2. The strategies χ˜1∗ and χ˜2∗ obtained from
the dynamic programs are, respectively, min-max and max-min strategies in
the expanded virtual game.
The results associated with Game H , stated above, have been obtained
simply by specializing the approach for solving the more general Game G
to the model of Game H . In the subsequent sections, we will derive some
additional properties of the dynamic program in Section 5.2.2 that are specific
to the model of Game H .
5.3 An Equilibrium Strategy for the More-informed Player
The following result shows that the strategy χ˜1∗ obtained by solving the min-
max dynamic program can be used to construct an equilibrium strategy for
Player 1 in the original game H .
Theorem 3 Let the solution to the min-max and max-min dynamic programs
in Section 5.2 be (χ˜1∗, χ˜2∗). Also, let χ1∗ := ̺1(χ˜1∗, χ˜2∗). Then χ1∗ is an
equilibrium (minimax) strategy for Player 1 in the virtual game Hv. Define
g1∗ such that g1∗t (p
1
t , ct) = [χ
1∗
t (ct)](p
1
t ), for every t ≤ T and pt, ct. Then g
1∗
is an equilibrium (minimax) strategy for player 1 in the original game G .
Proof See Appendix K.
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Theorem 3 proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium (g1∗, g2∗) in the game
G , where g1∗ is a CIB strategy. That is, under the strategy g1∗, player 1 selects
his behavioral action δU1t using the state Xt and common information based
belief Πt.
5.4 Computational Aspects
The value functions in the dynamic programs in Section 5.2.2 admit the fol-
lowing structural property.
Lemma 8 (Piecewise linearity and convexity) At each time t, (i) the
min-max value function V ut and the max-min value function V
l
t are identical;
(ii) there exists a finite collection At of vectors of size |Xt| such that
V lt (πt) = max
ℓ∈At
〈ℓ, πt〉. (37)
Consequently, the value functions are piecewise linear and convex functions of
the belief πt. At each time t, let Vt := V
l
t = V
u
t .
Proof See Appendix J.
This structural property of value functions allows us to approximately solve
the dynamic program in the following manner. This method is inspired by the
function approximation based methods for dynamic programming in [8].
At each time t, let Vˆt(πt, θt) be a representation of the value function Vt(πt)
in parametric form, where θt is a vector representing the parameters. Note that
this representation is an estimate of the true value function Vt(πt) and may not
be exactly to it. Since we know that the value function Vt is piecewise linear
and convex, we can enforce the parametric representation Vˆt to be piecewise
linear and convex in πt for any θt. One such representation is as follows:
Vˆ lt (πt, θt) = max
ℓt∈Aˆt
〈ℓt, πT 〉 (38)
where Aˆt is a finite collection of vectors of size |Xt|. Here, θt is the column
vector obtained by stacking all the vectors ℓ ∈ Aˆt.
Remark 11 We would like to emphasize that the representation described
above is not the only way to represent a piecewise linear and convex func-
tion. Notice that the sum (or the maximum) of piecewise linear and convex
functions is piecewise linear and convex. Exploiting this fact, we can design
a piecewise linear and convex architecture for Vˆt with multiple layers simi-
lar to that of deep neural networks [36]. It is possible that such a layered
representation may be more effective than the representation described above.
The parameters θt are chosen in a backward inductive manner such that
the function Vˆ lt (·, θt) is close to the true value function Vt. More precisely, at
time t, we uniformly (may be random or deterministic) sample belief vectors
Zero-sum Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Information 19
from the simplex St to obtain a finite collection of belief vectors πt. Let this
collection be St. For each belief vector πt ∈ St, we will compute
wˆt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) := c˜t(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) +
∑
zt+1
γ2t (u
2
t )Vˆt+1
(
Qt(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1), θt+1
)
(39)
V¯t(πt) := min
γ1t
max
γ2t
wˆt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ). (40)
Since wˆt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) is linear in γ
2
t , the min-max problem above can be formu-
lated as
min
γ1t∈B
1
t ,ν∈R
ν
subject to wˆt(πt, γ
1
t ,1(u
2
t )) ≤ ν, ∀u
2
t ∈ U
2
t ,
where 1(u2t ) denotes the prescription with γ
2
t (u
2
t ) = 1. Notice that since Vˆt+1
is piecewise linear and convex in πt+1, the function wˆt is convex in γ
1
t . We can
prove this using the same arguments as in Appendix J.2. Therefore, the opti-
mization problem stated above is a convex program and can be solved using
standard convex optimization algorithms [7,11]. We can then solve the follow-
ing regression problem to obtain a piecewise linear and convex representation
of Vˆt
min
θt
∑
πt∈St
(Vˆ (πt, θt)− VT (πt))
2. (41)
One approach to solving this regression problem is to use stochastic gradient
descent [10]. Thus, at each time t, we have an approximate representation of
the value function Vt.
In general, there may be a trade-off between the computational burden
and approximation error associated with this algorithm. That is, to achieve
lower approximation error, we may have to sample a very large number of
beliefs. This in turn increases the computational complexity of performing
the regression in the approach described above. Understanding the precise
relationship between approximation error and computational complexity is a
problem for future work and beyond the scope of this paper.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a general model of zero-sum stochastic games
with asymetric information. For this general model, we provided a dynamic
programming approach for characterizing the value (if it exists). This dynamic
programming characterization of value relies on our construction of two virtual
games that have the same value as our original game. If the value does not exist
then, our dynamic program provides bounds on the upper and lower values of
the zero-sum game. We then focused on game models in which one player has
complete game information and the other has partial information. For such
games, we showed that the value exists and used our dynamic programming
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approach to characterize the value. Further, we proved the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in such games where the more-informed player plays a common
information belief based strategy. We discussed a dynamic programming ap-
proach for computing a common information belief based equilibrium strategy
for the more-informed player.
A Proof of Lemma 1
It was shown in [26] that there exist bijective mappings Mi : Gi → Hi, i = 1, 2, such that
for every g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2, we have
J(g1, g2) = J (M1(g1),M2(g2)). (42)
Therefore, for any strategy g1 ∈ G1, we have
sup
g2∈G2
J(g1, g2) = sup
g2∈G2
J (M1(g1),M2(g2)) (43)
= sup
χ2∈H2
J (M1(g1), χ2). (44)
Consequently,
inf
g1∈G1
sup
g2∈G2
J(g1, g2) = inf
g1∈G1
sup
χ2∈H2
J (M1(g1), χ2) (45)
= inf
χ1∈H1
sup
χ2∈H2
J (χ1, χ2). (46)
This implies that Su(G ) = Su(Gv). We can similarly prove that Sl(G ) = Sl(Gv).
Remark 12 We can also show that a strategy profile (g1, g2) is a Nash equilibrium in game
G if and only if (M1(g1),M2(g2)) is a Nash equilibrium in game Gv .
B Proof of Lemma 2
Let us consider the evolution of the virtual game Gv under the strategy profile (χ1, χ2) and
the expanded virtual game Ge under the strategy profile (χ˜1, χ˜2). Let the primitive variables
in both games be identical. The variables such as the state, action and information variables
in the expanded game Ge are distinguished from those in the virtual game Ge by means of
a tilde. For instance, Xt is the state in game Gv and X˜t is the state in game Ge.
We will prove by induction that the system evolution in both these games is identical
over the entire horizon. This is clearly true at the end of time t = 1 because the state,
observations and the common and private information variables are identical in both games.
Moreover, since χi = ̺i(χ˜1, χ˜2), i = 1, 2, the strategies χi1 and χ˜
i
1 are identical by definition
(see Definition 2). Thus, the prescriptions and actions at t = 1 are also identical.
For induction, assume that the system evolution in both games is identical until the end
of time t. Then,
Xt+1 = ft(Xt, U
1:2
t ,W
s
t ) = ft(X˜t, U˜
1:2
t ,W
s
t ) = X˜t+1.
Using equations (2), (4) and (3), we can similarly argue that Y it+1 = Y˜
i
t+1, P
i
t+1 = P˜
i
t+1
and Ct+1 = C˜t+1. We also have
Γ˜ it+1 = χ˜
i
t+1(C˜t+1, Γ˜
1:2
1:t ) = χ
i
t+1(C˜t+1) = Γ
i
t+1. (47)
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This follows from the construction of the mapping ̺it and the fact that Ct+1 = C˜t+1.
Further,
U it+1 = κ(Γ
i
t+1(P
i
t+1), V
i
t+1) = κ(Γ˜
i
t+1(P˜
i
t+1), V
i
t+1) (48)
= U˜ it+1. (49)
Thus, the hypothesis is true for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T . This proves that the virtual and expanded
games have identical dynamics under strategy profiles (χ1, χ2) and (χ˜1, χ˜2).
Since the virtual and expanded games have the same cost structure, having identical
dynamics ensures that strategy profiles (χ1, χ2) and (χ˜1, χ˜2) have the same expected cost
in games Gv and Ge, respectively. Therefore, J (χ1, χ2) = J (χ˜1, χ˜2).
C Proof of Theorem 1
For any strategy χ1 ∈ H1, we have
sup
χ˜2∈H˜2
J (χ1, χ˜2) ≥ sup
χ2∈H2
J (χ1, χ2), (50)
because H2 ⊆ H˜2. Further,
sup
χ˜2∈H˜2
J (χ1, χ˜2) = sup
χ˜2∈H˜2
J (̺1(χ1, χ˜2), ̺2(χ1, χ˜2)). (51)
= sup
χ˜2∈H˜2
J (χ1, ̺2(χ1, χ˜2)) (52)
≤ sup
χ2∈H2
J (χ1, χ2), (53)
where the first equality is due to Lemma 2, the second equality is due to (??) in Claim 2
and the last inequality is due to the fact that ̺2(χ1, χ˜2) ∈ H2 for any χ˜2 ∈ H˜2.
Combining (50) and (53), we obtain that
sup
χ2∈H2
J (χ1, χ2) = sup
χ˜2∈H˜2
J (χ1, χ˜2). (54)
Now,
Su(Ge) := inf
χ˜1∈H˜1
sup
χ˜2∈H˜2
J (χ˜1, χ˜2) (55)
≤ inf
χ1∈H1
sup
χ˜2∈H˜2
J (χ1, χ˜2) (56)
= inf
χ1∈H1
sup
χ2∈H2
J (χ1, χ2), (57)
=: Su(Gv). (58)
where the inequality (56) is true since H1 ⊆ H˜1 and the equality in (57) follows from (54).
Therefore, Su(Ge) ≤ Su(Gv). We can use similar arguments to show that Sl(Gv) ≤ Sl(Ge).
D Proof of Lemma 3
We begin with defining the following transformations for each time t. Recall that St is the
set of all possible common information beliefs at time t and Bit is the prescription space for
virtual player i at time t.
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Definition 4 (i) Let P jt : St×B
1
t ×B
2
t → ∆(Zt+1 ×Xt+1 ×P
1
t+1 ×P
2
t+1) be defined as
P jt (πt,γ
1:2
t ; zt+1, xt+1, p
1:2
t+1) (59)
:=
∑
xt,p
1:2
t ,u
1:2
t
πt(xt, p
1:2
t )γ
1
t (p
1
t ; u
1
t )γ
2
t (p
2
t ;u
2
t )
× P[xt+1, p
1:2
t+1, zt+1 | xt, p
1:2
t , u
1:2
t ]. (60)
We will use P jt (πt, γ
1:2
t ) as a shorthand for the probability distribution P
j
t (πt, γ
1:2
t ; ·, ·, ·).
The distribution P jt (πt, γ
1:2
t ) can be viewed as a joint distribution over the variables
Zt+1,Xt+1, P 1:2t+1 if the distribution on Xt, P
1:2
t is πt and prescriptions γ
1:2
t are chosen
by the virtual players.
(ii) Let Pmt : St ×B
1
t × B
2
t → ∆Zt+1 be defined as
Pmt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1)
=
∑
xt+1,p
1:2
t+1
P jt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1, xt+1, p
1:2
t+1). (61)
The distribution Pmt (πt, γ
1:2
t ) is the marginal distribution of the variable Zt+1 ob-
tained from the joint distribution P jt (πt, γ
1:2
t ) defined above.
(iii) Let Ft : St × B1t ×B
2
t × Zt+1 → St+1 be defined as
Ft(πt, γ
1:2
t , zt+1) (62)
=


P
j
t (πt,γ
1:2
t ;zt+1,·,·)
Pmt (πt,γ
1:2
t ;zt+1)
if Pmt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1) > 0
Gt(πt, γ1:2t , zt+1) otherwise,
where Gt : St × B1t × B
2
t × Zt+1 → St+1 can be any arbitrary measurable mapping.
One such mapping is the one that maps every element πt, γ1:2t , zt+1 to the uniform
distribution over the finite space Xt+1 ×P1t+1 × P
2
t+1.
Let the collection of transformations Ft that can be constructed using the method described
in Definition 4 be denoted by B. Note that the transformations P jt , P
m
t and Ft do not depend
on the strategy profile (χ˜1, χ˜2) because the term P[xt+1, p1:2t+1, zt+1 | xt, p
1:2
t , u
1:2
t ] in (60)
depends only on the system dynamics (see equations (12) – (16)) and not on the strategy
profile (χ˜1, χ˜2).
Consider a strategy profile (χ˜1, χ˜2). Note that the number of possible realizations of
common information and prescription history under (χ˜1, χ˜2) is finite. Let ct+1, γ1:21:t be a
realization of the common information and prescription history at time t+ 1 with non-zero
probability of occurrence under (χ˜1, χ˜2). For this realization of virtual players’ information,
the common information based belief on the state and private information at time t + 1 is
given by
πt+1(xt+1, p
1:2
t+1)
= P(χ˜
1,χ˜2)[Xt+1 = xt+1, P
1:2
t+1 = p
1:2
t+1 | ct+1, γ
1:2
1:t ]
= P(χ˜
1,χ˜2)[Xt+1 = xt+1, P
1:2
t+1 = p
1:2
t+1 | ct, γ
1:2
1:t−1, zt+1, γ
1:2
t ]
=
P
(χ˜1,χ˜2)[Xt+1 = xt+1, P 1:2t+1 = p
1:2
t+1, Zt+1 = zt+1 | ct, γ
1:2
1:t ]
P(χ˜
1,χ˜2)[Zt+1 = zt+1 | ct, γ1:21:t ]
. (63)
Notice that the expression (63) is well-defined, that is the denominator is non-zero,
because of our assumption that the realization ct+1, γ1:21:t has non-zero probability of occur-
rence. Let us consider the numerator in the expression (63). For convenience, we will denote
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it with P(χ˜
1,χ˜2)[xt+1, p1:2t+1, zt+1 | ct, γ
1:2
1:t ]. We have
P
(χ˜1,χ˜2)[xt+1, p
1:2
t+1, zt+1 | ct, γ
1:2
1:t ]
=
∑
xt,p
1:2
t
,u1:2
t
πt(xt, p
1:2
t )γ
1
t (p
1
t ; u
1
t )γ
2
t (p
2
t ; u
2
t ) (64)
× P(χ˜
1,χ˜2)[xt+1, p
1:2
t+1, zt+1 | ct, γ
1:2
1:t , xt, p
1:2
t , u
1:2
t ] (65)
=
∑
xt,p
1:2
t ,u
1:2
t
πt(xt, p
1:2
t )γ
1
t (p
1
t ; u
1
t )γ
2
t (p
2
t ; u
2
t )
× P[xt+1, p
1:2
t+1, zt+1 | xt, p
1:2
t , u
1:2
t ] (66)
= P jt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1, xt+1, p
1:2
t+1), (67)
where πt is the common information belief on Xt, P 1t , P
2
t at time t given the realization
ct, γ1:21:t−1 and P
j
t is as defined in Definition 4. The equality in (66) is due to the struc-
ture of the system dynamics in game Ge described by equations (12) – (16). Similarly, the
denominator in (63) satisfies
0 < P[zt+1 | ct, γ
1:2
1:t ] =
∑
xt+1,p
1:2
t+1
P jt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1, xt+1, p
1:2
t+1)
= Pmt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1), (68)
where Pmt is as defined is Definition 4. Thus, from equation (63), we have
πt+1 =
P jt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1, ·, ·)
Pmt (πt, γ
1:2
t , zt+1)
= Ft(πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1), (69)
where Ft is as defined in Definition 4. Since the relation (69) holds for every realization
ct+1, γ1:21:t that has non-zero probability of occurrence under (χ˜
1, χ˜2), we can conclude that
the common information belief Πt evolves almost surely as
Πt+1 = Ft(Πt, Γ
1:2
t , Zt+1), t ≥ 1, (70)
under the strategy profile (χ˜1, χ˜2).
The expected cost at time t can be expressed as follows
E
(χ˜1,χ˜2)[ct(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t )] (71)
= E(χ˜
1,χ˜2)[E[ct(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t ) | Ct, Γ
1:2
1:t ]] (72)
= E(χ˜
1,χ˜2)[c˜t(Πt, Γ
1
t , Γ
2
t )], (73)
where the function c˜t is as defined in equation (22). Therefore, the total cost can be expressed
as
E
(χ˜1,χ˜2)
[
T∑
t=1
ct(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t )
]
= E(χ˜
1,χ˜2)
[
T∑
t=1
c˜t(Πt, Γ
1
t , Γ
2
t )
]
. (74)
E Some Continuity Results
In this section, we will state and prove some technical results that will be useful for proving
Lemma 4.
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Let St denote the set of all probability distributions over the finite set Xt × P1t × P
2
t .
Thus, St is the set of all possible common information based beliefs at time t. Define
S¯t := {απt : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, πt ∈ St}. (75)
The functions c˜t in (22), P
j
t in (59), P
m
t in (68) and Ft in (69) were defined for any πt ∈ St.
We will extend the domain of the argument πt in these functions to S¯t as follows. For any
γit ∈ B
i
t, i = 1, 2, zt+1 ∈ Zt+1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and πt ∈ St, let
(i) c˜t(απt, γ1t , γ
2
t ) := αc˜t(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t )
(ii) P jt (απt, γ
1:2
t ) := αP
j
t (πt, γ
1:2
t )
(iii) Pmt (απt, γ
1:2
t ) := αP
m
t (πt, γ
1:2
t )
(iv) Ft(απt, γ1:2t , zt+1) :=
{
Ft(πt, γ1:2t , zt+1) if α > 0
0 if α = 0,
where 0 is a zero-vector of size |Xt × P1t ×P
2
t |.
Having extended the domain of the above functions, we can also extend the domain of
the argument πt in the functions wut (·), w
l
t(·), V
u
t (·), V
l
t (·) defined in the dynamic programs
of Section 4.2. First, for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and πT ∈ ST , define V
u
T (απt) := 0. We can then
define the following functions for every t ≤ T in a backward inductive manner: For any
γit ∈ B
i
t, i = 1, 2, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and πt ∈ St, let
wut (απt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) := c˜t(απt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t )+∑
zt+1
[
Pmt (απt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1)V
u
t+1(Ft(απt, γ
1:2
t , zt+1))
]
(76)
V ut (απt) := inf
γ1t
sup
γ2t
wut (απt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ). (77)
Note that when α = 1, the above definition of wut is equal to the definition of w
u
t in equation
(26) of the dynamic program. We can similarly extend wlt and V
l
t . These extended value
functions satisfy the following homogeneity property. A similar result was shown in [19,
Lemma III.1] for a special case of our model.
Lemma 9 For any constant 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and any πt ∈ S¯t, we have αV ut (πt) = V
u
t (απt) and
αV lt (πt) = V
l
t (απt).
Proof The proof can be easily obtained from the above definitions of the extended functions.
The following lemmas will be used in Appendix F to establish some useful properties of the
extended functions.
Lemma 10 Let V : S¯t+1 → R be a continuous function satisfying V (απ) = αV (π) for
every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and π ∈ S¯t+1. Define
V ′(πt,γ
1
t , γ
2
t )
:=
∑
zt+1
Pmt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1)[V (Ft(πt, γ
1:2
t , zt+1))].
For a fixed γ1t , γ
2
t , V
′(·, γ1t , γ
2
t ) is a function from S¯t+1 to R. Then, the family of functions
F1 := {V
′(·, γ1t , γ
2
t ) : γ
i
t ∈ B
i
t, i = 1, 2} (78)
is equicontinuous.
Similarly, the following families of functions
F2 := {V
′(πt, ·, γ
2
t ) : γ
2
t ∈ B
2
t , πt ∈ S¯t} (79)
F3 := {V
′(πt, γ
1
t , ·) : γ
1
t ∈ B
1
t , πt ∈ S¯t} (80)
are equicontinuous in their respective arguments.
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Proof A continuous function is bounded and uniformly continuous over a compact domain
(see Theorem 4.19 in [34]). Therefore, V is bounded and uniformly continuous over S¯t+1.
Using the fact that V (απ) = αV (π) and the definition of Ft in Definition 4, V can be
written as
V ′(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) =
∑
zt+1
V
(
P jt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1, ·, ·)
)
. (81)
Recall that P jt is trilinear in πt, γ
1
t and γ
2
t with bounded coefficients for a fixed value of
zt+1 (see (59)). Therefore, for each zt+1, {P
j
t (·, γ
1
t , γ
2
t , zt+1)} is an equicontinuous family
of functions in the argument πt, where P
j
t (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t , zt+1) is a short hand notation for the
measure P jt (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t , zt+1, ·, ·) over the space Xt+1 × P
1
t+1 ×P
2
t+1.
Also, since V is uniformly continuous, the family
{
V
(
P jt (·, γ
1:2
t , zt+1)
)}
is equicontin-
uous in πt for each zt+1. This is because composition with a uniformly continuous function
preserves equicontinuity. Therefore, the family of functions F1 is equicontinuous in πt. We
can use similar arguments to prove equicontinuity of the other two families.
Lemma 11 Let w : B1t × B
2
t → R be a function such that (i) the family of functions
{w(·, γ2) : γ2 ∈ B2t } is equicontinuous in the first argument; (ii) the family of functions
{w(γ1, ·) : γ1 ∈ B1t } is equicontinuous in the second argument. Then supγ2 w(γ
1, γ2) is a
continuous function of γ1 and, similarly, infγ1 w(γ
1, γ2) is a continuous function of γ2.
Proof Let ǫ > 0. For a given γ1, there exists a δ > 0 such that
|w(γ1, γ2) −w(γ′1, γ2)| ≤ ǫ ∀γ2,∀||γ1 − γ′1|| ≤ δ. (82)
Let γ¯2 be a prescription such that
w(γ1, γ¯2) = sup
γ2
w(γ1, γ2). (83)
Note that the existence of γ¯2 is guaranteed because of continuity of w(γ1, ·) in the second
argument and compactness of B2t . Pick any γ
′1 satisfying ||γ1 − γ′1|| ≤ δ. Let γ¯′2 be a
prescription such that
w(γ′1, γ¯′2) = sup
γ2
w(γ′1, γ2). (84)
Using (82), we have
(i) w(γ1, γ¯2) −w(γ′1, γ¯′2) ≥ w(γ1, γ¯′2)− w(γ′1, γ¯′2)
≥ −ǫ, (85)
(ii) w(γ1, γ¯2) −w(γ′1, γ¯′2) ≤ w(γ1, γ¯2)− w(γ′1, γ¯2)
≤ ǫ, (86)
Equations (83) - (86) imply that supγ2 w(γ
1, γ2) is a continuous function of γ1. We can use
a similar argument for showing continuity of infγ1 w(γ
1, γ2) in γ2.
F Proof of Lemma 4
We first use the definitions of extensions of wut , w
l
t, V
u
t , V
l
t in Appendix E and Lemmas 9
and 10 to establish the following equicontinuity result.
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Lemma 12 The families of functions
F
a
t := {w
u
t (·, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) : γ
i
t ∈ B
i
t, i = 1, 2} (87)
F
b
t := {w
u
t (πt, ·, γ
2
t ) : γ
2
t ∈ B
2
t , πt ∈ S¯t} (88)
F
c
t := {w
u
t (πt, γ
1
t , ·) : γ
1
t ∈ B
1
t , πt ∈ S¯t} (89)
are all equicontinuous in their arguments for every t ≤ T . A similar statement holds for
wlt.
Proof We use a backward induction argument for the proof. For induction, assume that V ut+1
is a continuous function for some t ≤ T . This is clearly true for t = T . Using the continuity
of V ut+1 we will establish the statement of the lemma for time t and the continuity of V
u
t .
This establishes the lemma for all t ≤ T .
Equicontinuity of wut : Since c˜t(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) is linear in πt with uniformly bounded coef-
ficients for any given γ1:2t (see (22)), it is equicontinuous in the argument πt. In Lemma 9,
we showed that the value functions V ut satisfy the condition V
u
t (απ) = αV
u
t (π) for every
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, π ∈ St. Further, due to our induction hypothesis, V ut+1 is continuous. Thus,
using Lemma 10, the second term of wut ,∑
zt+1
Pmt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1)V
u
t+1(Ft(πt, γ
1:2
t , zt+1)),
is also equicontinuous in πt. Hence, the family Fat is equicontinuous in πt.
Continuity of V ut : Due to the equicontinuity of the family F
a
t , we have the following.
For any given ǫ > 0 and πt ∈ S¯t, there exists a δ > 0 such that
|wut (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t )− w
u
t (π
′
t, γ
1
t , γ
2
t )| < ǫ (90)
for every γ1t , γ
2
t and ||πt − π
′
t|| < δ. Therefore,
wut (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) < w
u
t (π
′
t, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) + ǫ ∀γ
1
t , γ
2
t (91)
=⇒ sup
γ2t
wut (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) ≤ sup
γ2t
wut (π
′
t, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) + ǫ ∀γ
1
t (92)
=⇒ inf
γ1t
sup
γ2t
wut (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) ≤ inf
γ1t
sup
γ2t
wut (π
′
t, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) + ǫ
=⇒ V ut (πt) ≤ V
u
t (π
′
t) + ǫ, (93)
for every π′t that satisfies ||πt − π
′
t|| < δ. Similarly, V
u
t (πt) ≥ V
u
t (π
′
t) − ǫ for every π
′
t that
satisfies ||πt − π′t|| < δ. Therefore, V
u
t (πt) is continuous at πt.
Hence, by induction, we can say that the family Fat is equicontinuous in πt for every
t ≤ T . We can use similar arguments to prove the equicontinuity of the other families.
The continuity of wut established above implies that supγ2t
wut (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) is achieved for
every πt, γ1t . Further, Lemma 12 implies that w
u
t and w
l
t satisfy the equicontinuity conditions
in Lemma 11 for any given realization of belief πt. Therefore, we can use Lemma 11 to argue
that supγ2t
wut (πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) is continuous in γ
1
t . And since γ
1
t lies in the compact space B
1
t ,
a minmaximizer exists for the function wut . Further, we can use the measurable selection
condition (see Condition 3.3.2 in [18]) to prove the existence of measurable mapping χ˜1∗t (πt)
as defined in Lemma 4. A similar argument can be made for maxminimizer to establish the
existence of χ˜2∗t (πt). This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.
G Proof of Theorem 2
Let us first define a distribution Π˜t over the space Xt × P1t × P
2
t in the following manner.
The distribution Π˜t, given Ct, Γ 1:21:t−1, is recursively obtained using the following relation
Π˜τ+1 = Fτ (Π˜τ , Γ
1
τ , Γ
2
τ , Zτ+1), τ ≥ 1, (94)
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where Fτ is as defined in Definition 4 in Appendix D. We refer to this distribution as the
strategy-independent common information belief (SI-CIB).
Let χ˜1 ∈ H˜1 be any strategy for virtual player 1 in game Ge. Consider the problem
of obtaining virtual player 2’s best response to the strategy χ˜1 with respect to the cost
J (χ˜1, χ˜2) defined in (18). This problem can be formulated as a Markov decision process
(MDP) with common information and prescription history Ct, Γ 1:21:t−1 as the state. The
control action at time t in this MDP is Γ 2t , which is selected based on the information
Ct, Γ 1:21:t−1 using strategy χ˜
2 ∈ H2. The evolution of the state Ct, Γ 1:21:t−1 of this MDP is as
follows
{Ct+1, Γ
1:2
1:t } = {Ct, Zt+1, Γ
1:2
1:t−1, χ˜
1
t (Ct, Γ
1:2
1:t−1), Γ
2
t }, (95)
where
P
(χ˜1,χ˜2)[Zt+1 = zt+1 | Ct, Γ
1:2
1:t−1, Γ
2
t ] = P
m
t [Π˜t, Γ
1
t , Γ
2
t ; zt+1], (96)
almost surely. Here, Γ 1t = χ˜
1
t (Ct, Γ
1:2
1:t−1) and the transformation P
m
t is as defined in Def-
inition 4 in Appendix D. Notice that due to Lemma 3, the common information belief Πt
associated with any strategy profile (χ˜1, χ˜2) is equal to Π˜t almost surely. This results in the
state evolution equation in (96). The objective of this MDP is to maximize, for a given χ˜1,
the following cost
E
(χ˜1,χ˜2)
[
T∑
t=1
c˜t(Π˜t, Γ
1
t , Γ
2
t )
]
, (97)
where c˜t is as defined in equation (22). Due to Lemma 3, the total expected cost defined
above is equal to the cost J (χ˜1, χ˜2) defined in (18).
The MDP described above can be solved using the following dynamic program. For
every realization of virtual players’ information cT+1, γ
1:2
1:T , define
V χ˜
1
T+1(cT+1, γ
1:2
1:T ) := 0.
In a backward inductive manner, for each time t ≤ T and each realization ct, γ1:21:t−1, define
V χ˜
1
t (ct, γ
1:2
1:t−1) = sup
γ2t
[c˜t(π˜t, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) + E[V
χ˜1
t+1(ct, Zt+1, γ
1:2
1:t ) | ct, γ
1:2
1:t ]], (98)
where γ1t = χ˜
1
t (ct, γ
1:2
1:t−1) and π˜t is the SI-CIB associated with the information ct, γ
1:2
1:t−1.
Note that the measurable selection condition (see condition 3.3.2 in [18]) holds for the
dynamic program described above. Thus, the value functions V χ˜
1
t (·) are measurable and
there exists a measurable best-response strategy for player 2 which is a solution to the
dynamic program described above. Therefore, we have
sup
χ˜2
J (χ˜1, χ˜2) = EV χ˜
1
1 (C1).
Claim 1 For any strategy χ˜1 ∈ H˜1 and for any realization of virtual players’ information
ct, γ1:21:t−1, we have
V χ˜
1
t (ct, γ
1:2
1:t−1) ≥ V
u
t (π˜t), (99)
where V ut is as defined in (26) and π˜t is the SI-CIB belief associated with the instance
ct, γ1:21:t−1. As a consequence, we have
sup
χ˜2
J (χ˜1, χ˜2) ≥ EV u1 (Π1). (100)
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Proof The proof is by backward induction. Clearly, the claim is true at time t = T + 1.
Assume that the claim is true for all times greater than t. Then we have
V χ˜
1
t (ct, γ
1:2
1:t−1) = sup
γ2t
[c˜t(π˜t, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) + E[V
χ˜1
t+1(ct, Zt+1, γ
1:2
1:t ) | ct, γ
1:2
1:t ]]
≥ sup
γ2t
[c˜t(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) + E[V
u
t+1(Ft(π˜t, γ
1:2
t , Zt+1)) | ct, γ
1:2
1:t ]]
≥ V ut (πt).
The first equality follows from the result in (98) and the inequality after that follows from
the induction hypothesis. The last inequality is a consequence of the definition of the value
function V ut . This completes the induction argument. Further, we have
sup
χ˜2
J (χ˜1, χ˜2) = EV χ˜
1
1 (C1) ≥ EV
u
1 (Π1).
We can therefore say that
Su(Ge) = inf
χ˜1
sup
χ˜2
J (χ˜1, χ˜2) ≥ inf
χ˜1
EV u1 (Π1) = EV
u
1 (Π1).
Further, for the strategy χ˜1∗ defined in Lemma 4, the inequalities (99) and (100) hold with
equality. We can prove this using the same inductive argument used to prove the Claim 1.
Therefore, we have
Su(Ge) = inf
χ˜1
sup
χ˜2
J (χ˜1, χ˜2) ≤ sup
χ˜2
J (χ˜1∗, χ˜2) = EV χ˜
1∗
1 (C1) = EV
u
1 (Π1).
Su(Ge) = EV
u
1 (Π1).
A similar argument can be used to show that
Sl(Ge) = EV
l
1 (Π1).
H Proof of Lemma 6
We will prove the lemma using the following claim.
Claim 2 Consider any arbitrary strategy g1 for player 1. Then, there exists a strategy g¯1
for player 1 such that, for each t, g¯1t is a function of Xt and I
2
t and
J(g¯1, g2) = J(g1, g2), ∀g2 ∈ G2.
Suppose that the above claim is true. Let h1 be an equilibrium strategy for player 1 (we
know one exists due to Proposition 2). Since we are dealing with a zero-sum game, we know
that (a) h1 achieves the infimum in infg1∈G1 supg2∈G2 J(g
1, g2), (b) any strategy achieving
the infimum in the above inf-sup problem will be an equilibrium strategy for player 1 [29].
Due to Claim 2, there exists a strategy h¯1 for player 1 such that, for each t, h¯1t is a
function only of Xt and I2t and
J(h¯1, g2) = J(h1, g2),
for every strategy g2 ∈ G2. Therefore, we have that
sup
g2∈G2
J(h¯1, g2) = sup
g2∈G2
J(h1, g2) = inf
g1∈G1
sup
g2∈G2
J(g1, g2).
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Thus, h¯1 is an equilibrium strategy for player 1 that uses only the current state and player
2’s information.
Proof of Claim 2: We now proceed to prove Claim 2. Consider any arbitrary strategy
g1 for player 1. Let ι2t = {u
2
1:t−1, y
2
1:t} be a realization of player 2’s information I
2
t . Define
the distribution Ψt(ι2t ) over the space
∏t
τ=1(Xτ × U
1
τ ) as follows:
Ψt(ι
2
t ; x1:t, u
1
1:t) := P
g1,h2 [X1:t, U
1
1:t = (x1:t, u
1
1:t) | I
2
t = ι
2
t ],
if ι2t is feasible, that is P
g1,h2 [I2t = ι
2
t ] > 0, under the open-loop strategy h
2 = (u21:t−1) for
player 2. Otherwise, define Ψt(ι2t ;x1:t, u
1
1:t) to be the uniform distribution over the space∏t
τ=1(Xτ × U
1
τ ).
Lemma 13 Let g1 be player 1’s strategy and let g2 be an arbitrary strategy for player 2.
Then for any realization x1:t, u11:t of the variables X1:t, U
1
1:t, we have
P
g1,g2 [X1:t, U
1
1:t = (x1:t, u
1
1:t) | I
2
t ] = Ψt(I
2
t ;x1:t, u
1
1:t),
almost surely.
Proof From player 2’s perspective, the system evolution can be seen in the following manner.
The system state at time t is St = (X1:t, U11:t, I
2
t ). Player 2 obtains a partial observation Y
2
t
of the state at time t. Using information {Y 21:t, U
2
1:t−1}, player 2 then selects an action U
2
t .
The state then evolves in a controlled Markovian manner (with dynamics that depend on
g1). Thus, from player 2’s perspective, this system is a partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP). The claim then follows from the standard result in POMDPs that the
belief on the state given the player’s information does not depend on the player’s strategy
[?].
For any instance ι2t of player 2’s information I
2
t , define the distribution Φt(ι
2
t ) over the
space Xt × U1t as follows
Φt(ι
2
t ; xt, u
1
t ) =
∑
x1:t−1,u
1
1:t−1
Ψt(ι
2
t ;x1:t, u
1
1:t). (101)
Define strategy g¯1 for player 1 such that for any realization xt, ι2t of state Xt and player 2’s
information I2t at time t, the probability of selecting an action u
1
t at time t is
g¯1t (xt, ι
2
t ; u
1
t ) (102)
=


Φt(ι
2
t ;xt,u
1
t )∑
u1
′
t
Φt(ι
2
t ;xt,u
1′
t )
if
∑
u1
′
t
Φt(ι2t ; xt, u
1′
t ) > 0
U (·) otherwise,
(103)
where U (·) denotes the uniform distribution over the action space U1t .
Lemma 14 For any strategy g2 for player 2, we have
P
(g1,g2)[U1t = u
1
t | Xt, I
2
t ] = g¯
1
t (Xt, I
2
t ; u
1
t )
with probability 1 for every u1t ∈ U
1
t .
Proof Let xt, ι2t be a realization that has a non-zero probability of occurrence under the
strategy profile (g1, g2). Then using Lemma 13, we have
P
(g1,g2)[X1:t, U
1
1:t = (x1:t, u
1
1:t) | ι
2
t ] = Ψt(ι
2
t ;x1:t, u
1
1:t), (104)
30 Dhruva Kartik, Ashutosh Nayyar
for every realization x1:t−1 of states X1:t−1 and u11:t of actions U
1
1:t. Summing over all
x1:t−1, u11:t and using (101) and (104), we have
P
(g1,g2)[Xt = xt | I
2
t = ι
2
t ] =
∑
u1t
Φt(ι
2
t ;xt, u
1
t ). (105)
The left hand side of the above equation is positive since xt, i2t is a realization of positive
probability under the strategy profile (g1, g2).
Using Bayes’ rule, (104), (101) and (102), we obtain
P
g1,g2 [U1t = u
1
t | Xt = xt, I
2
t = ι
2
t ] =
Φt(ι2t ;xt, u
1
t )∑
u1
′
t
Φt(ι2t ;xt, u
1′
t )
= g¯1t (xt, ι
2
t ; u
1
t ). (106)
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
We can now show that the strategy g¯1 defined in (102) satisfies
J(g¯1, g2) = J(g1, g2),
for every strategy g2 ∈ G2. Because of the structure of the cost function in (6), it is sufficient
to show that for each time t, the random variables (Xt, U1t , U
2
t , I
2
t ) have the same joint
distribution under strategy profiles (g1, g2) and (g¯1, g2). We prove this by induction. It is
easy to verify that at time t = 1, (X1, U11 , U
2
1 , I
2
1 ) have the same joint distribution under
strategy profiles (g1, g2) and (g¯1, g2).
Now assume that at time t,
P
g1,g2 [xt, u
1
t , u
2
t , ι
2
t ] = P
g¯1,g2 [xt, u
1
t , u
2
t , ι
2
t ]. (107)
for any realization of state, actions and player 2’s information xt, u1t , u
2
t , ι
2
t .
At t + 1, for any realization xt+1, u1t+1, u
2
t+1, ι
2
t+1 that has non-zero probability of oc-
currence under the strategy profile (g1, g2), we have
P
g1,g2 [xt+1, u
1
t+1, u
2
t+1, ι
2
t+1] (108)
= Pg
1,g2 [xt+1, ι
2
t+1]g
2
t (ι
2
t+1; u
2
t+1)P
g1,g2 [u1t+1 | xt+1, ι
2
t+1]
= Pg
1,g2 [xt+1, ι
2
t+1]g
2
t (ι
2
t+1; u
2
t+1)g¯
1
t (xt+1, ι
2
t+1;u
1
t+1) (109)
= Pg
1,g2 [xt+1, ι
2
t+1]g
2
t (ι
2
t+1; u
2
t+1)P
g¯1 [u1t+1 | xt+1, ι
2
t+1], (110)
where the equality in (109) follows from Lemma 14. Consider the first term in (110), and
let ι2t+1 = (ι
2
t , u
2
t , y
2
t+1).
P
g1,g2 [xt+1, ι
2
t+1]
=
∑
x¯t,u¯
1
t
P[xt+1, y
2
t+1 | x¯t, u¯
1
t , u
2
t , ι
2
t ]P
g1,g2 [x¯t, u¯
1
t , u
2
t , ι
2
t ]
=
∑
x¯t,u¯
1
t
P[xt+1, y
2
t+1 | x¯t, u¯
1
t , u
2
t , ι
2
t ]P
g¯1,g2 [x¯t, u¯
1
t , u
2
t , ι
2
t ] (111)
= Pg¯
1,g2 [xt+1, ι
2
t+1]. (112)
The equality in (111) is due to the induction hypothesis. Note that the conditional distri-
bution P[xt+1, ι2t+1 | xt, u
1
t , u
2
t , ι
2
t ] does not depend on players’ strategies (see equations (1)
and (2)). Combining equations (110) and (111), we have
P
g1,g2 [xt+1, u
1
t+1, u
2
t+1, ι
2
t+1] = P
g¯1,g2 [xt+1, u
1
t+1, u
2
t+1, ι
2
t+1].
Therefore, by induction, this is true for all t. This proves our claim. 
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I Proof of Lemma 7
We construct a transformation Ft as described in Definition 4 and show that this transfor-
mation does not use virtual player 2’s prescription γ2t .
In Game He, the corresponding transformation P
j
t (see Definition 4) has the following
form
P jt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1, xt+1) (113)
= γ2t (∅;u
2
t )
∑
xt,u
1
t
πt(xt)γ
1
t (xt;u
1
t )P[xt+1, y
2
t+1 | xt, u
1
t , u
2
t ]
=: γ2t (u
2
t )Qt(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1;xt+1). (114)
Note that zt+1 = {y2t+1, u
2
t }. The corresponding transformation P
m
t (see Definition 4) has
the following form
Pmt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1) =
∑
xt+1
γ2t (u
2
t )Qt(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1;xt+1)
=: γ2t (u
2
t )Rt(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1). (115)
Following the methodology in Definition 4, we define Ft as
Ft(πt, γ
1:2
t , zt+1) (116)
=


P
j
t (πt,γ
1:2
t ,zt+1,·)
Pmt (πt,γ
1:2
t ;zt+1)
if Pmt (πt, γ
1:2
t ; zt+1) > 0
Gt(πt, γ1:2t , zt+1) otherwise,
where the transformation Gt is chosen to be
Gt(πt, γ
1:2
t , zt+1) (117)
=


Qt(πt,γ
1
t ,zt+1)
Rt(πt,γ
1
t ,zt+1)
if Rt(πt, γ1t , zt+1) > 0
U (Xt+1) otherwise,
where U (Xt+1) is the uniform distribution over the space Xt+1. Using the results (114)
and (115), we can simplify the expression for the transformation Ft in (116) to obtain the
following
Ft(πt, γ
1:2
t , zt+1) (118)
=


Qt(πt,γ
1
t ,zt+1)
Rt(πt,γ
1
t ,zt+1)
if Rt(πt, γ1t , zt+1) > 0
U (Xt+1) otherwise.
This concludes the construction of an update rule Ft in the class B that does not use virtual
player 2’s prescription γ2t .
J Proof of Lemma 8
We prove the lemma for the extensions of min-max and max-min value functions defined
over S¯t. Recall that S¯t is the set of all vectors απt where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and πt is a probability
distribution on Xt × P1t × P
2
t . We refer the reader to Appendix E for the definition and a
key property (Lemma 9) of the extended min-max and max-min value functions.
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Induction hypothesis at time t: Assume that for every τ , such that T ≥ τ ≥ t, (i) the
value functions V uτ+1(πτ+1) = V
l
τ+1(πτ+1) =: Vτ+1(πτ+1) for every πτ+1 ∈ S¯τ+1, and (ii)
Vτ+1 is piecewise linear and convex in πτ+1, i.e.
Vτ+1(πτ+1) = max
ℓ∈Aτ+1
〈ℓ, πτ+1〉, (119)
where Aτ+1 is a finite collection of vectors of size Xτ+1. Note that this hypothesis is true for
t = T since V uT+1(πT+1) = V
l
T+1(πT+1) = 0 =: VT+1(πT+1) for every πT+1 by definition.
Using the induction hypothesis at time t, we will prove it for time t−1. Thus, we need to
establish that (i) V ut (πt) = V
l
t (πt) =: Vt(πt) for every πt ∈ S¯t, and that (ii) Vt is piecewise
linear and convex in πt.
J.1 Equality of V ut and V
l
t
Consider any πt ∈ S¯t. Since the functions V ut+1 and V
l
t+1 are identical (due to the induction
hypothesis), the functions wut and w
l
t defined in Section 4.2 (see equation (76) in Appendix
E) are also identical. Let wt := wut = w
l
t. The value functions V
u
t and V
l
t at time t are thus
given by
V ut (πt) := inf
γ1t
sup
γ2t
wt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) (120)
V lt (πt) := sup
γ2t
inf
γ1
t
wt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ). (121)
Note that V ut (πt) and V
l
t (πt) can be viewed as the upper and lower values of a single
stage zero-sum game in which the minimizing player selects a prescription γ1t ∈ B
1
t , the
maximizing player selects a prescription γ2t ∈ B
2
t , and the cost function is wt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ).
Let us denote this single stage game by SGt(πt). According to Sion’s minimax theorem [38],
the upper and lower values of game SGt(πt) are equal, i.e. V ut (πt) = V
l
t (πt), if the cost
wt(πt, γ1t , γ
2
t ) and the prescription spaces B
1
t and B
2
t satisfy the following conditions: (i) The
sets B1t and B
2
t are convex and compact in a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. (ii) The
function wt(πt, γ1t , γ
2
t ) is continuous and convex in γ
1
t for any given γ
2
t , and it is continuous
and concave in γ2t for any given γ
1
t . It is clear that the first condition holds for SGt(πt)
because the prescriptions are mappings from a finite space to a probability simplex. We now
focus on the second condition.
From Lemma 12 in Appendix F, we know that wt(πt, γ1t , γ
2
t ) is continuous in γ
1
t for any
fixed γ2t and it is continuous in γ
2
t for any given γ
1
t . Further, from Lemma 7 in Section 5.2.1,
we know that the belief update function Ft does not depend on the prescription γ2t . Thus,
using the notation defined in equations (114) and (115) of Appendix I, the function wt, as
defined in (76), can be expressed as
wt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) = c˜t(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) +
∑
zt+1
γ2t (u
2
t )Rt(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1)Vt+1
(
Ft(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1)
)
= c˜t(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) +
∑
zt+1
γ2t (u
2
t )Vt+1
(
Qt(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1)
)
, (122)
where the last equality is because of Lemma 9 in Appendix E. Convexity (resp. concavity )
condition holds for the first term in (122) because of its bilinear structure in prescriptions
for a fixed πt (see (22)). Thus, we only need to show that the convexity (resp. concavity)
condition holds for the second term in (122).
For a fixed γ1t , the second term in (122) is linear in γ
2
t . Thus, it is concave in γ
2
t .
Recall that the measure Qt(πt, γ1t , zt+1) is linear in γ
1
t for a fixed πt (see (114)) and
Vt+1 is convex due to our induction hypothesis. Therefore, for a fixed γ2t , the composi-
tion Vt+1
(
Qt(πt, γ1t , zt+1)
)
is convex in γ1t . Hence, the second term in (122) is convex in γ
1
t
for a fixed γ2t . Thus, both conditions of Sion’s theorem are valid for the single state game
SGt(πt). Hence, V ut (πt) = V
l
t (πt) =: Vt(πt) for every πt ∈ S¯t.
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J.2 Piecewise Linearity and Convexity of Vt
We first prove the following claims.
Claim 3 For each u2 ∈ U2t , there exists a finite set D(u
2) of vectors of size |Xt × U1t | such
that
wt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) =
∑
u2
γ2t (u
2) max
d∈D(u2)
∑
xt,u
1
t
d(xt, u
1
t )πt(xt)γ
1
t (xt;u
1
t ) (123)
=:
∑
u2
γ2t (u
2) max
d∈D(u2)
〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉, (124)
where πtγ1t denotes the vector representation of the measure πt(xt)γ
1
t (xt;u
1
t ) over the space
Xt × U1t .
Proof Consider the second term of wt in (122). Due to the induction hypothesis, we have∑
zt+1
γ2t (u
2
t )Vt+1(Qt(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1)) (125)
=
∑
zt+1
γ2t (u
2
t ) max
ℓ∈At+1
〈ℓ, Qt(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1)〉 (126)
=
∑
u2t
γ2t (u
2
t )

∑
y2
t+1
max
ℓ∈At+1
∑
xt+1
ℓ(xt+1)Qt(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1; xt+1)

 . (127)
Note that zt+1 = {u2t , y
2
t+1}. Using the fact that Qt is linear in the product measure πtγ
1
t
(see (114)), we can say that the term
max
ℓ∈At+1
∑
xt+1
ℓ(xt+1)Qt(πt, γ
1
t , zt+1;xt+1)
is piecewise linear and convex in the product measure πtγ1t , for each zt+1. Further, since
the sum of piecewise linear and convex functions is piecewise linear and convex, we can say
that for each u2 ∈ U2t , there exists a finite set D
′(u2) of vectors of size |Xt × U1t | such that
(125) is equal to
∑
u2
γ2t (u
2)

 max
d∈D′(u2)
∑
xt,u
1
t
d(xt, u
1
t )πt(xt)γ
1
t (xt;u
1
t )

 (128)
=
∑
u2
γ2t (u
2) max
d∈D′(u2)
〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉. (129)
Combining this fact with (122), we have
wt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) = c˜t(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) +
∑
u2
γ2t (u
2) max
d∈D′(u2)
〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉. (130)
Instantaneous cost c˜t has the following structure (see (22))
c˜t(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) =
∑
xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t
πt(xt)γ
1
t (xt;u
1
t )γ
2
t (u
2
t )ct(xt, u
1
t , u
2
t ).
Using the structure in (130), we can conclude that for each u2 ∈ U2t , there exists a finite set
D(u2) of vectors of size |Xt × U1t | such that
wt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) =
∑
u2
γ2t (u
2) max
d∈D(u2)
〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉. (131)
This concludes the proof of the claim.
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Let Et be the collection of all mappings e : U2t → ∆[∪u2∈U2
t
D(u2)] such that for every
u2, e(u2; d) = 0 is d /∈ D(u2). For some mapping e and some action u2 ∈ U2t , the probability
associated with a vector d ∈ D(u2) is denoted by e(u2; d).
Claim 4 We have
Vt(πt) (132)
= max
γ2t
min
γ1t
max
e∈Et
∑
u2
∑
d∈D(u2)
γ2t (u
2)e(u2; d)〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉 (133)
= max
γ2t
max
e∈Et
min
γ1t
∑
u2
∑
d∈D(u2)
γ2t (u
2)e(u2; d)〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉. (134)
Proof Because of Claim 3, we have
wt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) =
∑
u2
γ2t (u
2) max
d∈D(u2)
〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉 (135)
=
∑
u2
γ2t (u
2) max
λ∈∆D(u2)
∑
d∈D(u2)
λ(d)〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉 (136)
= max
e∈Et
∑
u2
∑
d∈D(u2)
γ2t (u
2)e(u2; d)〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉. (137)
For any fixed γ2t , we have
min
γ1t
wt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) = min
γ1t
max
e∈Et
∑
u2
∑
d∈D(u2)
γ2t (u
2)e(u2; d)〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉 (138)
= max
e∈Et
min
γ1t
∑
u2
∑
d∈D(u2)
γ2t (u
2)e(u2; d)〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉. (139)
The last inequality is a consequence of Sion’s minimax theorem []. We can apply Sion’s
theorem here because the sets B1t and Et are compact and convex, and the function∑
u2
∑
d∈D(u2)
γ2t (u
2)e(u2; d)〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉
is convex in γ1t and concave in e. The claim then follows from (139) and the fact that
Vt(πt) = max
γ2t
min
γ1t
wt(πt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ). (140)
Let Pt ⊂ R
|U2t×∪u2∈U2
t
D(u2)|
be the polytope that is characterized by the following
constraints ∑
u2∈U2t ,d∈∪u2∈U2
t
D(u2)
r(u2, d) = 1 (141)
r(u2, d) ≥ 0 ∀u2 ∈ U2t , d ∈ ∪u2∈U2t
D(u2) (142)
r(u2, d) = 0 if d /∈ D(u2). (143)
Notice that the objective in the max-max-min problem in (134), is a function of the product
γ2t (u
2)e(u2, d). The product γ2t e is a joint distribution over the space U
2
t × ∪u2∈U2t
D(u2).
One can easily show that the set
Pt = {γ
2
t e : γ
2
t ∈ B
2
t , e ∈ Et}. (144)
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Therefore, using Claim 4, we have
Vt(πt) (145)
= max
γ2t
max
e∈Et
min
γ1t
∑
u2
∑
d∈D(u2)
γ2t (u
2)e(u2; d)〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉 (146)
= max
r∈P
min
γ1t
∑
u2
∑
d∈D(u2)
r(u2, d)〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉. (147)
Claim 5 The value of the expression (134), and thus Vt(πt), is equal to the optimal value
of the following linear program
max
r∈P,ν∈R|Xt|
∑
xt
πt(xt)ν(xt)
s. t.
∑
u2∈U2t ,d∈∪u2∈U2
t
D(u2)
r(u2, d)d(xt , u
1
t ) ≥ ν(xt), ∀u
1
t ∈ U
1
t , xt ∈ Xt.
Proof Consider the following imaginary Bayesian zero-sum game. Fix πt. Nature selects xt
using the distribution πt. The minimizing player in this imaginary game observes xt and
selects a distribution over the space U1t using the prescription γ
1
t . The maximizing player
selects a distribution from the set Pt. The cost function associated with these selections is
p(γ1t , r) :=
∑
u2
∑
d∈D(u2)
∑
xt,u
1
t
r(u2, d)πt(xt)γ
1
t (xt; u
1
t )d(xt, u
1
t ) (148)
=
∑
u2
∑
d∈D(u2)
r(u2, d)〈d, πtγ
1
t 〉. (149)
Notice that the value of this finite Bayesian game exists and is equal to the maxmin value in
(147) and thus, equal to the value function Vt(πt). The value of this game can be obtained
by the linear program given in [31] which leads us to the desired result.
As mentioned earlier, the optimum value of the linear program in Claim 5 is finite.
Thus, there exists a solution to this linear program such that it is an extreme point of the
polytope formed by the constraints (see Corollary 2 in Chapeter 2 of [20]). Also, since there
are only finitely many extreme points (see Corollary 3 in Chapeter 2 of [20]), we can restrict
the optimization variables in the linear program to this finite set of extreme points. Let this
set of extreme points be Et. Therefore,
Vt(πt) = max
r,ν∈Et
∑
xt
πt(xt)ν(xt). (150)
This proves that the value function Vt(πt) is piecewise linear and convex in πt. This com-
pletes the induction step of our proof.
K Proof of Theorem 3
According to Lemma 7, the belief πt at time t does not depend on player 2’s prescriptions
γ21:t−1. Thus, the strategy χ˜
1∗ uses only the common information ct and player 1’s past
prescriptions γ11:t−1. Because of this structure, we have
χ1∗ := ̺1(χ˜1∗, χ˜2∗) = ̺1(χ˜1∗, χ˜2) (151)
for any strategy χ˜2. Let us assume that χ1∗ is not a minimax strategy for the game Gv .
Therefore, there exists χ2 ∈ H2 such that
J (χ1∗, χ2) > S(Gv). (152)
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Based on the result in (151) and the fact that ̺2(χ˜1, χ2) = χ2 for any χ˜2 ∈ H˜1, we have
(χ1∗, χ2) = ̺(χ˜1∗, χ2). (153)
Hence, using Lemma 2 we have
J (χ˜1∗, χ2) = J (χ1∗, χ2) > S(Gv) = S(Ge). (154)
This is a contradiction because χ˜1∗ is a minimax strategy of Ge by construction. Therefore,
χ1∗ must be a minimax strategy of game Gv .
Using the approach in [26], we can show that if χ1∗ is a minimax strategy in the virtual
game Gv for player 1, then g1∗ defined in Theorem 3 is a minimax strategy in the original
game G for player 1.
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